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ABSTRACT 
The growth of the Internet has created a corresponding growth in Internet-based crimes and online 
misbehavior, particularly among younger computer-savvy people. Younger generations have grown up in a 
world where internet access, social networking, e-commerce and smartphones are commonplace. Given this 
fact, they have learned how to use, and how to abuse, technology. This leads us to define a new category of 
cybercrime called a Personal Denial of Service attack (PDOS). A PDOS is a cyber-crime in which an 
individual deliberately prevents the access of another individual or small group to online services such as 
email or banking. Due to the nature of a PDOS, these acts can be overlooked by law enforcement and 
organizations that operate Internet infrastructure, such as universities. Our motivation for this work is 
twofold: to stress the need for cyber ethics education at the university level, and to illustrate how a previously 
uncategorized type of cyber crime is easily perpetrated in such an environment. To achieve these goals, we 
define a PDOS attack and discuss how it differs from other categories of attacks. We also examine the 
motivation for a PDOS attack in the context of the Routine Activities Theory of criminal justice. We further 
discuss a "proof of concept" survey administered at four different universities to ascertain their attitudes 
towards online account breaches as related to a PDOS attack. The survey provides initial evidence that 
account breaches, which are an integral part of a PDOS attack, are a worrisome threat on university campuses 
and further points to a need for cyber ethics training. 
Keywords: Personal Denial of Service (PDOS) attack, Routine Activities theory 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The explosive growth of the Internet across the 
world has created a burgeoning generation of young 
people who are very computer-savvy and that spend 
a good deal of their time online. Activities such as 
participating in Massively Multiplayer Online 
Games (MMOG's), chatting and posting information 
on Facebook, and managing their bank accounts and 
financial information online are everyday activities 
for a generation born in the Internet age. 
Unfortunately, with the knowledge of how to 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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conduct their lives with devices linked to the vast 
information superhighway, comes the ability to be 
tempted by its darker side. Posting child 
pornography online, cyber bullying, and 
perpetrating Internet fraud are just a few examples 
of the unethical and illegal activities that some 
Internet users engage in. The potential reasons for 
initiating these activities are myriad, but Routine 
Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) has 
been put forth to help explain the origins of crimes 
such as these. Part of the premise of Routine 
Activities Theory is the presumption that anyone 
may commit a crime if given the opportunity or 
circumstances to do so. A related presumption that 
follows from this is that victims of such crimes 
consciously placed themselves in situations where 
such crimes may occur. These notions, although 
controversial to some sociologists and 
criminologists, set the stage for the discussion and 
analysis of our proposed category of cyber-crime: 
Personal Denial of Service Attack (PDOS).  
A PDOS is an attack on a person or small group 
where access to online services is denied through a 
clever manipulation of the security procedures and 
safeguards used by the online service providers. 
With the reliance on "the cloud" for using remotely 
hosted applications (as is the case with the use of 
Application Service Providers (ASPs) for many 
businesses and organizations nowadays), 
synchronizing applications between devices (such as 
Apple computers and devices), storage (Dropobx 
and many other cloud or online based storage 
applications), and a myriad of other purposes, 
uninterrupted access to online services accounts is 
not just a luxury, but a necessity for everyday life. 
Although similar at first thought to a Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack, a PDOS distinguishes itself 
through the sequence of actions used to carry it out 
and through its intended number of victims. 
Comparisons to other forms of cyber-crime such as 
cyber-stalking (which includes cyber-harassment as 
a subcategory) also fall short due to the fact that no 
private information concerning a victim is necessary 
to carry out a simple PDOS attack. According to 
Wikipedia, in the context of cyber-harassment, “the 
definition of ‘harassment’ must meet the criterion 
that a reasonable person, in possession of the same 
information, would regard it as sufficient to cause 
another reasonable person distress In its simplest 
form, a PDOS can be performed using public 
information such as an email address. 
This research examines an environment where 
unlimited Internet access and close proximity to 
potential victims provides a perfect setting for such 
attacks to go un-policed. An example of this would 
be universities, where Internet-savvy young people, 
many with the "gaming" mentality, advanced online 
technical knowledge, and underdeveloped ethics, are 
prime candidates to commit a PDOS attack. While 
some people may view the results of a PDOS as 
nothing more than a minor inconvenience, it has the 
potential for causing monetary and life-changing 
results. Consider the example of a person who pays 
credit card and other bills via online banking on the 
day that they are due. If such a person is denied 
access to the online banking site on the due date for 
bills, and does not have the time or means to contact 
the bank or companies involved to make other 
payment arrangements, such a person may incur late 
fees for a late payment, a reduced credit score, an 
increase in interest rates on credit cards and other 
financial penalties.  
PDOS attacks have the potential to cause further 
financial harm when they exploit account auto 
lockout security procedures in online auction 
sites. Perhaps two users, user A and user B are 
competing against each other for an auction item. 
There is potential for user A to lock out user B using 
publicly available account ID information by simply 
attempting to log in as user B several times with 
incorrect passwords. If timed correctly near the end 
of the auction, user A can ensure that user B does not 
win the auction, and therefore user A has a greater 
chance of winning the auction item. This action 
would not only financially hurt the seller, but the 
auction site as well since they would receive a 
smaller commission from the sale assuming that 
further competition between A and B would have 
driven up the final auction price.  
Pogue points out that with the most recent version of 
the Apple Macintosh operating system, the 
synchronization of calendars, address books, etc., 
with other Apple devices must be accomplished 
through Apple's iCloud online service (Pogue, 
2014). A disruption to accessing one's account on 
this service could have serious ramifications, both 
professionally and personally. Another example of 
the potential harm caused by a PDOS could involve 
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a university student who waits literally until the last 
minute to turn in a take-home exam or assignment. 
If denied access to their university account and 
unable to turn in the exam or assignment before the 
deadline, the denial of online access could cost the 
student dearly in terms of their final class grade, their 
grade point average, their class ranking, their 
scholarship, and thus their attractiveness to company 
employment recruiters. Any time-sensitive 
transaction, be it financial in nature or not, that 
requires online services to complete, has the 
potential for disruption by a PDOS. The potentially 
serious impact of a PDOS, when combined with the 
possibility of an escalation of a PDOS attacker to 
more serious cyber-crimes, points out the need for 
education on online ethics and how to avoid 
becoming a victim of such attacks. 
2. DEFINITION OF A PDOS 
The term PDOS should be distinguished from the 
recently contrived acronym PDoS. This latter type of 
cyber-crime attack, a Permanent Denial of Service 
(PDoS) or "Phlashing", is a cyber-security breach 
that exploits vulnerabilities in network-based 
firmware updates and attempts to render the target 
device(s) inoperable. A PDoS is an example of the 
more general type of cyber-crime called a Denial of 
Service attack (DoS). Our proposed category, 
PDOS, is distinct from both a PDoS and its related 
more general category DoS. In its most general 
definition, a DoS is an information security breach 
or attack that attempts to render a device, a network, 
or a system unavailable to its intended users. The 
new type of cyber-crime attack we are proposing, a 
PDOS, is similar in spirit to a DoS in that it attempts 
to render online services unavailable to a person or 
small group of people while remaining anonymous, 
but differs from a traditional DoS attack in several 
ways. These differences include the intended victim 
of the attack, the nature of the targeted device or 
devices, the sequence of actions to conduct the 
attack itself, the potential results of a successful 
attack, the nature of anonymity, and the motivation 
for the attack.  
2.1 Intended Victim 
While a traditional DoS attack is directed towards 
the information assets and/or network infrastructure 
of a company, government, or other type of 
organization, a PDOS is directed at the online 
services and accounts used by a single person or 
small group of people. In a traditional DoS attack, 
the victim is an organization or company that 
operates the device, network, or system targeted. 
Time, money, and human resources must be spent by 
the victim in order to recover from a successful DoS, 
or even to react to an attempted one if detected. 
Secondary victims are possible in a traditional DoS 
if legitimate outside users or customers are also 
affected. Unlike a DoS, a PDOS would be intended 
to have a single individual as a victim or a small 
group of people. Secondary victims of a PDOS could 
include the companies providing the online services 
targeted by the attacker in that resources must be 
used to create new accounts, change account 
parameters, and/or deal with the primary victim.  
To show the gravity of a PDOS attack and further 
illustrate the difference between a PDOS and a 
traditional DoS, we pose two simple questions. The 
first of these is whether the resources invested to 
prevent or remedy DoS attacks differ from PDOS 
attacks in the corporate world. The second is 
whether the notoriety surrounding, and potential 
impacts of, traditional DoS attacks differ from 
PDOS attacks. When potentially thousands of users 
are impacted by a DoS attack, the resources spent 
can be quite staggering depending upon the size of 
the company or organization involved. The costs 
associated with firewalls, intrusion detection 
systems, and bringing networks and devices back to 
fully operational state are not trivial. Resources 
spent with regards to a potential PDOS attack would 
only involve policies and procedures that limit 
personal and account information from being 
utilized for such attacks. Although the costs 
associated with putting such policies and procedures 
in place are not zero, they would certainly not 
approach those expended for DoS attacks. 
Furthermore, a DoS is usually newsworthy event 
where a company’s operations, and therefore its 
revenue stream and profitability, are adversely 
impacted. A PDOS would not necessarily affect a 
company’s operations other than possibly disrupting 
the life of an employee or small group. It should be 
clear from this discussion that a PDOS attack is not 
specifically planned by a corporate information 
security function in an organization. However, to the 
person impacted by the PDOS attack, be it a 
consumer trying to access a website in order to make 
a purchase, or an employee attempting to access 
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their online banking account during lunch hour, the 
results are the same. Both are denied access. This 
research puts forth the premise that a PDOS is a 
novel type of attack that “falls under the radar”, but 
has an impact similar to a DoS on a smaller, more 
personal scale.  
2.2 Nature of Targeted Devices 
A traditional DoS targets devices (network 
infrastructure, servers, etc.) operated by an 
organization in order to limit their functionality. A 
PDOS does not target a given set of devices, but 
instead targets the services provided such an 
infrastructure to an individual or small group, 
including both local and cloud resources. A clear 
distinction with respect to this factor is that an 
attacker must have some minimum knowledge of the 
devices being attacked for a DoS to be successful. In 
the case of a PDOS, no such knowledge is necessary 
to carry out the attack; only knowledge of how to 
access those services online is required.  
2.3 Sequence of Actions to Conduct a PDOS 
Unlike a DoS, a PDOS does not attempt to actually 
manipulate a device, a network, service, or a system 
to prevent its proper functioning. In fact a PDOS 
would take advantage of security measures put in 
place by network, system, and security 
administrators to mask the PDOS activities to ensure 
such an attack would succeed. For example, a 
traditional DoS might flood a given company's web 
server with excess "useless" traffic in order to 
overwhelm it capability to serve legitimate online 
customers. In this case the attacker is attempting to 
disguise the excess traffic as legitimate traffic until 
it overwhelms the server. A PDOS takes the opposite 
approach. It deliberately wants user traffic, or the 
attempt to access services to be seen as a threat to the 
online service provider in order to have existing 
security measures enacted. An example of a PDOS 
taking advantage of security measures would be the 
ability to "lock out" an online service user's account 
by attempting to log onto that account multiple times 
unsuccessfully. The intent of the PDOS in this case 
is not to gain actual access to the account, but to 
prevent the legitimate user from having access to the 
account for an indefinite period of time. Only after 
the legitimate user takes certain steps, such as 
changing a password or contacting the online service 
provider to provide verification of identity, can the 
service be restored. Unlike a traditional DoS, one 
might state that no "hacking" actually occurs against 
the online service provider in a PDOS; and therefore, 
it may not be considered illegal in many 
jurisdictions. A DoS attack requires special 
knowledge of the network or system being attacked 
to be successful. Such knowledge is usually gained 
from one or more smaller reconnaissance attacks 
that are used to learn about network security 
mechanisms and technical vulnerabilities of the 
target. On the other hand, a PDOS attacker can 
utilize information that is more easily obtained to 
carry out a successful attack. Information, such as 
email addresses, may be publicly available; and 
techniques such as social engineering can be used for 
gather the requisite information for an attack. 
Sometimes an action as simple as looking over a 
person's shoulder as they log in to an online service 
is all that is needed for a successful PDOS. 
2.4 Potential Results of a Successful Attack 
A successful DoS renders a web server, a network, a 
system, etc., (the target of the attack) inaccessible to 
legitimate users for an indefinite period of time. This 
period of time can vary and depends on three major 
criteria:  
a. The ability of the organization operating the 
target(s) attacked to recognize the attack and 
take remedial action. 
b. The nature of the target attacked (type of 
device or system). 
c. The specific technical details of the DoS 
(which can vary and affect the ability of the 
 organization to recognize the DoS and take 
action). 
DoS attacks are usually recognized and acted upon 
by the victim in time periods of seconds or minutes 
and not hours or days. In contrast to the potential for 
very costly and serious results of a successful DoS, 
the results of a successful PDOS are much harder to 
detect and much less evident to everyone, including 
the primary victim. The inability to access an online 
service such as banking, email, social media, etc., 
while creating feelings of frustration or anger from 
the victim, may be incorrectly attributed to a variety 
of non-PDOS causes. Some of the possible problems 
that a PDOS could be attributed to (from the victim's 
point of view) include excessive network traffic, 
Internet connectivity problems, web server 
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problems, Domain Name Server (DNS) problems, or 
a forgotten password. It would take possibly several 
successful PDOS attacks for a victim to even realize 
that such an attack has occurred. Even if the victim 
realizes there is something amiss, it is likely he or 
she has not documented the attacks or has any true 
understanding of what a PDOS attack is. Unlike the 
steps a company or organization would take to 
remedy a DoS and to prevent another one (such as 
immediately blocking certain open ports and 
developing a profile for the traffic signature of the 
attack), a victim of a PDOS would have little 
recourse other than to change the parameters of 
existing accounts (passwords, account names, etc.) 
and to create new accounts, possibly with different 
online service providers. It should be obvious that 
only the most cautious of online service users would 
take such actions after a single successful PDOS 
attack. It would most likely take several successful 
PDOS attacks to prompt such actions from a victim.   
2.5 Nature of the Anonymity 
A further difference between a DoS and a PDOS is 
the degree of sophistication for achieving anonymity 
to which an attacker has to achieve in order to have 
a successful attack. A DoS attacker would need to 
have a high level of sophistication in his or her attack 
in order to remain anonymous if attacking a 
company or organization with even modest 
information security protection in place. A 
Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS), which 
would use remote programs installed on unknowing 
participants' devices to carry out an attack, in some 
sense guarantees initial anonymity for the attacker. 
In this case, anonymity is achieved due to the fact 
that the actual attack is not coming from the attacker 
per se, but from other innocent parties. A PDOS 
would differ from both of these in that the attacker 
needs much less sophistication to remain 
anonymous. For instance, the use of a proxy server 
to access online accounts would only be necessary 
for an occasional PDOS attack in order to hide the 
attacker's IP address. Only if an attacker seeks to 
continue a series of PDOS attacks against a target 
would more sophistication be necessary. "Criminals 
hide in cyberspace, but complete invisibility can 
sometimes be difficult to achieve (Wild, et al., 
2011)." Selwyn surveyed university students about 
online misbehavior and pointed out that "some 
respondents described such anonymity in 
opportunistic terms, with the Internet giving users 
'the chance to conceal their identity and hence make 
it easier for them to be deceitful (Selwyn, 2008)." 
The ease with which a PDOS attacker can initially 
conceal his or her identity for a few attacks certainly 
distinguishes this type of attack from a traditional 
DoS. It would only be after at least a few PDOS 
attacks that the victim would be suspicious and 
possibly take action such as having online service 
providers track attempts to login to his or her 
account. Such conditions would necessarily force an 
attacker who wishes to continue PDOS attacks to use 
more technical and complex means for anonymity. 
2.6 Motivation of the Attacker 
The motivation for conducting a DoS can vary and 
includes the following possibilities:  
a. Corporate espionage where a hired attacker 
is paid to attack the e-commerce or other 
information systems capabilities and 
functions of a competitor. 
b. The making of a political statement against 
a company or organization through an 
announced attack. 
c. An amateurish "script kiddie" attack for 
amusement or challenge. 
d. Disgruntled employee or customer seeking 
revenge; and other similar forms of 
motivation.  
Only the last two in this list might be considered 
somewhat similar to a PDOS. Revenge would 
certainly be a possible motive for a PDOS; but 
unlike a DoS where the revenge is directed at an 
organization, it would be directed at an individual or 
small group.  There are also other factors related to 
motivation that set the two types of attacks apart. 
The likelihood that a victim would suffer through 
several successful PDOS attacks before taking 
action is an important difference between a PDOS 
and a traditional DoS. This likelihood would also 
play a role in the motivation of the attacker. The 
likelihood of success of a PDOS is high, if an 
attacker has basic knowledge about the victim, 
online services and the Internet in general. Some 
limited knowledge of the victim such as what 
services are used and possibly a general pattern of 
when those services are accessed are required for a 
successful PDOS. This knowledge can be gained in 
a variety of ways that vary from intimate contact 
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with the victim to social engineering where no 
relationship with the victim is required. The ease 
with which this knowledge can be acquired can be 
additional motivation for this type of attack. 
Obviously this knowledge threshold is much lower 
than what is required for a successful DoS, where 
technical knowledge is required about computer 
networking and an organization's possible cyber 
security defenses. 
3. CLASSIFYING A PDOS 
We propose that a PDOS be considered a new 
category of cyber-crime. It does not fit in traditional 
categories such as those proposed by Yar (2006). He 
defines four categories of cybercrime: 
a. Cyber-trespass – crossing boundaries into 
other people's property and/or causing 
damage. 
b. Cyber-deceptions and theft – stealing and 
fraud. 
c. Cyber-pornography – breaching laws on 
obscenity and decency. 
d. Cyber-violence – doing psychological harm 
to, or inciting physical harm against others. 
One might consider the frustration experienced and 
time wasted by a PDOS victim when not being able 
to access online services to be a form of 
psychological harm, but a PDOS differs from 
traditional forms of cyber-crime that would fit into 
the category of cyber-violence. Unlike cyber 
stalking, in which the attacker often intentionally 
makes his or her identity known to the victim, a 
PDOS is carried out in a truly anonymous fashion 
due to the ability to disguise one's cyber presence as 
the source of an attack with limited technical 
expertise. Cyber harassment can loosely define the 
motivation for a PDOS, but unlike traditional cyber 
harassment where a person sends disparaging 
electronic communications or posts such content 
online, a PDOS has a direct connection to the 
availability of an online service providers' accounts. 
For example, it takes little technical skill to post false 
or disparaging comments on social media such as 
Facebook about a victim of cyber harassment; but to 
disguise one's online identity in order to carry out a 
PDOS to deny a person access to their Facebook 
account requires a slightly higher level of expertise. 
What also makes a PDOS a new phenomenon in the 
context of cyber-crime and information security 
theory is the use of information security 
methodologies normally reserved for more serious 
security breaches of companies (such as the 
disguising of IP addresses previously mentioned) 
against an individual or small group of people. 
Therefore, although one might be tempted to 
categorize a PDOS as just another form of cyber 
harassment, the additional technical sophistication 
sets it apart. A PDOS can be distinguished from 
cyber stalking because the latter has a more 
ominous, malevolent, and physically dangerous 
nature. Generally speaking, a cyber-stalker seeks to 
use a cyber- presence to exert some degree of control 
over a person or group and may even threaten or 
commit physical violence against victim(s). In 
attempting to exert control, the identity of the stalker 
may be revealed to the victim(s). Reyns, et al. (2011) 
define cyber stalking as "the repeated pursuit of an 
individual using electronic or Internet-capable 
devices". Unlike a cyber-stalker, a PDOS attacker is 
not in "pursuit" of a victim. A PDOS also would not 
want his or her identity known to the victim since it 
would make future attacks more difficult. While the 
threat of physical violence is absent in our definition 
of a PDOS, an attacker's actions could escalate into 
cyber stalking or other more serious crimes against 
a victim. Even with the lack of a physical threat and 
an anonymous attacker, the element of seeking to 
exert control over a victim(s) is allowed under our 
definition of a PDOS. It is possible for an attacker 
committing a series of PDOS attacks to attempt to 
influence the victim in some way. An example of 
this would be a series of attacks conducted by an 
estranged husband against his wife during 
acrimonious divorce proceedings. Such attacks, if 
conducted properly (so as to be not traceable back to 
him) might create such frustration on her part that 
she is more willing to negotiate during divorce 
proceedings. Even if she suspected that he is the 
source of the attacks, without proper evidence, 
which would be difficult or possibly impossible to 
collect, no action could be taken against him.  
Neves and Pinheiro (2010) define cyber bullying as 
the use of communication technologies and 
information to denigrate, humiliate and/or defame a 
person or a group of people. A PDOS can be 
distinguished from this definition because the 
destruction of a person's character or reputation is 
not the motivation for a PDOS attack. It may become 
a secondary result of multiple PDOS attacks, but the 
attacker is not intending such consequences directly. 
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One characteristic of a PDOS that sets it apart is the 
necessity to disguise one's electronic identity in 
order to carry out a series of PDOS attacks. To mask 
one's Internet Protocol (IP) address, an attacker 
could use strategies involving proxy servers, onion 
routing (of which the application Tor is the most 
popular example), or other similar mechanisms. To 
mask one's Media Access Control (MAC) address, 
methodologies exist to "spoof" this factory-set 
address inherent to all network interfaces of 
electronic devices that are on local area networks. It 
should be obvious that although the knowledge of 
how to hide one's electronic fingerprint is available 
online, this technical expertise would set it apart 
from traditional cyber harassment.  
4. ROUTINE ACTIVITIES THEORY AND 
CYBERCRIMES 
Cohen and Felson (1979) describe the foundations 
for what is known as the Routine Activities Theory. 
"Not only do routine legitimate activities often 
provide the wherewithal to commit offenses or to 
guard against others who do so, but they also provide 
offenders with suitable targets" (Cohen and Felson, 
1979). The application of this theory in practice has 
focused on three necessary, but not sufficient, 
conditions within a given physical space or arena for 
crime to occur: the existence of a potential offender, 
the existence of a potential target, and the lack of 
authority necessary to prevent a crime from 
occurring. The application of Routine Activities 
Theory has been extended and applied beyond 
traditional high crime rates areas of physical space. 
It has also been applied across a variety of settings 
beyond chance physical encounters of an attacker 
and a victim. Miller posits that "... an individual's 
activities, regardless of whether unstructured, with 
friends, or absent authority figures, are carried out in 
a variety of physical and social settings" (Miller, 
2013). Some of these settings the theory has been 
applied to are general usage of the Internet and 
computer networks, social media, and online 
gaming. The linking of Routine Activities Theory to 
cybercrime was developed by Yar (2005). "In short, 
the online density of both potential offenders and 
potential targets is not neutral with respect to 
existing social ecologies, but translates them via the 
differential distribution of the resources and skills 
needed to be present and active in cyberspace" (Yar, 
2005). This statement can be simplified to the notion 
that the more time you spend in cyberspace, the more 
likely you are to be either an offender or a victim for 
a cybercrime. Marcum later used Routine Activities 
Theory as the backdrop for a statistical assessment 
of cyber-crime and its impact on adolescents 
(Marcum, 2009).  
A corollary also put forth by Yar (2005) is that "the 
greater the target's accessibility, the greater its 
suitability, and vice versa". This particular point 
supports the premise that unlimited Internet access 
in the relative absence of authority, as is seen on 
university campuses in computer laboratories, 
dormitories, etc., provides such great accessibility. 
Additionally, work by Holt and Bossler (2009) 
concludes that "committing computer-based 
deviance (the more formal term for unethical and 
illegal behavior in the literature) increases one's risk 
of online victimization, mirroring previous research 
that has identified an association between real-world 
delinquent behavior and victimization".  
Reyns (2013) analyzed the link between Routine 
Activities Theory and identity theft. He states that 
"results suggest that individuals who use the Internet 
for banking and/or e-mailing/instant messaging are 
about 50 percent more likely to be victims of identity 
theft than others". In other words, by merely using 
such online services, the risk of falling victim to this 
serious type of cybercrime increases dramatically. 
Along this same line of thinking, Hutchings and 
Hayes, in applying Routine Activities Theory to 
Phishing victimization, found that the routine 
activities of computer use and Internet banking were 
risk factors for phishing attacks, another type of 
cyber crime.  
Navarro and Jasinski (2012) analyzed cyber bullying 
in the context of the Routine Activities Theory. One 
interesting result coming out of their work points to 
an increased likelihood of becoming a victim of 
cyber bullying for young people who spend a good 
deal of time on "informative" websites, where a two 
way sharing of information (posting and reading) is 
conducted. Pratt, et al. (2010) applied the Routine 
Activities Theory to Internet fraud. They concluded 
that "to understand the problem of fraud targeting 
requires an appreciation of how online exposure 
shapes the opportunity structure for victimization in 
this context" (Pratt, et al., 2010). We posit that the 
large percentage of university students who spend a 
significant percentage of their time conducting these 
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online activities such as banking, emailing, and 
posting information online, thus exposing 
themselves to potential attackers, not only put 
themselves at risk for Internet fraud, identity theft, 
phishing attacks, or cyber bullying, but are also at 
risk for a PDOS. 
Before focusing on the prevalence of PDOS attacks 
in light of the Routine Activities Theory described 
above, an examination of another Internet-based 
online misbehavior will provide insight. A related, 
and equally disturbing, type of online misbehavior is 
called "Kicking". Kicking is a quasi-hacking 
technique where an online gaming participant, such 
as an Xbox user, is “kicked” of the online game they 
are participating in by another participant in that 
game. Utilizing free software tools, such as OXID’s 
Cain and Able (OXID, 2012) password recovery 
tool, the other participant actually crosses the line 
and becomes a "hacker" in performing such kicking. 
Using these tools, the other participant is able to gain 
access to the victim gamer’s IP (Internet Protocol) 
and MAC (Media Access Control) addresses. These 
addresses are then exploited to force the victim out 
of the game and to keep the victim from rejoining 
the game for some period of time. Under our 
definition of a PDOS, the denial of participation in 
an online game created through "kicking" would be 
considered an example of such a cyber-crime.  
Although typically viewed by the online gaming 
community and the general public as merely a form 
of malicious harassment, the information obtained 
through "kicking" can be used to perform more 
serious spoofs and attacks. Once the other 
participant has gained access to the target’s IP 
address, he can then ascertain what city and state the 
player is located in, determine the name of the 
service provider, and perform other malicious 
activities including sending a computer virus 
directly to the target’s machine or employing further 
reconnaissance techniques using tools such as Nmap 
(Nmap.org, 2012) to obtain additional private 
information about the victim. The escalation of 
"kicking" into a more serious form of cyber-crime, 
be it identity theft or some form of malicious 
hacking, shows the potential for a PDOS to be the 
precursor to more serious cyber-crimes. The fact that 
"kicking" even takes place during what is supposed 
to be a recreational activity also lends credence to 
the notion that online ethics are viewed in terms of 
"gray" and not "black and white" by online gamers. 
Adding further evidence to the bending of online 
ethics rules by the online gaming community is the 
sales of "booting" services. Booting is define as the 
commercialization of "kicking" where an online 
gamer can pay a third party to perform kicking 
against an opponent. This allows players seeking a 
gaming advantage or a form of revenge to pay for 
kicking against other online gamers of their choice 
(BBC, 2009). This type of behavior reminds one of 
industrial espionage where a company hires a third 
party hacker to attack a competitor's systems or 
network to gain a competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. Such booting services do not target a 
gaming console such as an Xbox directly, but rather 
they interfere with the victim’s internet connection 
(BBC, 2009). For approximately $20.00, some 
hackers performing kicking are even willing to 
remotely access their customer’s system and install 
the software tools for the customer to target players 
independent of the hacker (BBC, 2009). For a larger 
fee, some hackers will add the machine to what is 
termed a "botnet," thus enabling them to perform 
more powerful buffering or true DOS (Denial of 
Service) attacks against a targeted IP address (BBC, 
2009). Again, the presence of an individual in the 
online gaming community presents both an 
opportunity to conduct such online misbehavior and 
to fall victim to it. 
Gaming consoles are typically viewed as 
entertainment devices by the general public. As 
such, devices have migrated from single player 
environments with rudimentary graphical 
capabilities to powerful communication hubs. This 
increase in the computing power and communication 
capabilities of gaming consoles has coincided with 
an increase in their use for various forms of cyber-
crime, including crime within so-called "virtual 
worlds" that are part of the gaming experience 
(Pasupathi, 2001; Pew Internet Project, 2008; 
Prasad, et al., 2013). The technical aspects of the 
console and related player activities may lead to 
victimization by other players. For example, 
Microsoft's gaming console specifically controls 
certain attributes, or policies, related to the amount 
of user access to live gaming services. The ports on 
the gaming platform utilized for these controls are 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) ports 3074, 5060, 
and 5061 (CAI Networks, 2000). Considering that 
UDP is a connectionless protocol, this could provide 
hackers with additional vulnerabilities to exploit.  
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Also, the gaming console is connected to the Internet 
and therefore is just as susceptible to online attacks. 
Users need to harden their consoles similarly to how 
they currently protect their computers. When a 
participant or hacker attempts to perform kicking 
activities they target a player’s Internet connection 
and not the actual gaming console. This is possible 
because the gaming console is vulnerable to attacks 
involving the UDP 5060 port. Thus, when gamers 
who are not familiar with such technical details 
change their gaming console settings in an effort to 
host games with other players, they are unknowingly 
introducing more vulnerability into their systems. 
5. ROUTINE ACTIVITIES THEORY, PDOS, 
AND UNETHICAL STUDENT ONLINE 
BEHAVIOR 
As described previously, Routine Activities Theory 
in the context of a cyber-crime purports that the 
probability of being a victim is increased by having 
a greater cyber presence, which equates to a greater 
exposure to potential attackers. A substantial case 
can be made that a university environment provides 
the ideal place for this to occur. Although briefly 
described in the introduction, a more substantive 
argument can be made for analyzing the prevalence 
of cyber-crimes, including PDOS attacks, with 
respect to students in a university environment. The 
nature of a PDOS should be viewed in the light of 
other online misbehavior and unethical activities 
undertaken by computer-literate young people in 
their late teens and early twenties. These students 
who attend institutions of higher education have 
almost limitless access to high speed networks and 
Internet resources, and also less direct supervision 
than they had during their younger years. In 
particular, this last point fits well with the creation 
of an environment where potential attackers would 
feel more at ease than in the more controlled 
environments of their homes or previous schools 
where figures of authority had more direct control on 
their actions throughout the day and night. Reyns, et 
al. (2011) state that "guardianship, on the other hand, 
acts as a buffer against victimization by disrupting 
criminal opportunity structures, thereby decreasing 
likelihood of victimization".  
While computer hacking in general can be attributed 
to a lack of psychological maturity, it is our position 
that the demographic of traditional-age university 
students are particularly predisposed to committing 
a PDOS attack due to the access to high speed 
Internet connectivity, close proximity to fellow 
students' account information in various university 
settings such as dormitories and computer 
laboratories, and other questionable online behavior 
that occurs in such settings. Reyns, et al. (2010) 
investigated the factors connecting attackers to 
victims with respect to cyber stalking and university 
students. Their conclusions confirm that the 
application of the Routine Activities Theory to this 
cyber-crime in a university context is valid. Yar 
(2006) states that "... when applied to computer 
crime, such understandings attribute youthful 
participation in hacking to a combination of 
adolescent 'crisis' and ethical 'underdevelopment'; 
and conversely they can be used to explain why most 
individuals 'drop out' of hacking as they reach 
psychological maturity in their twenties" (Yar, 
2006).  
University students in the U.S. and some other 
Western countries already have a general reputation 
of compromised ethics with respect to their use of 
the Internet while on campus. Activities involving 
the illegal downloading of copyrighted material 
(music, movies, etc.), plagiarism involving websites 
(copying website content verbatim for assignments) 
or purchasing fully completed assignments online 
are not uncommon and often go unnoticed or 
overlooked by faculty and administration. Williams 
(2010) and collaborators  point out that in the case of 
illegal downloading of copyrighted material, 
increased Internet access creates the situation where 
"consumers will have the ability to download vast 
amounts of material, illegally or not". Thus, the 
Routine Activities Theory view of this issue would 
state that university students are in an environment 
where they can steal such material or have material 
stolen from them.  
Theft of copyrighted material over the Internet or 
intellectual property locally (as would be the case if 
one student copied another's assignment from his or 
her computer or online data storage without 
permission) on a university campus is just one 
example of unethical online behavior present within 
this environment. Selwyn (2008) surveyed 
university students and found that 93.9% of the 
respondents had perpetrated at least one of the 
following five types of online misbehavior in the 
year prior to the survey: misrepresentation of self, 
unauthorized use of another's account, plagiarism of 
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an essay or assignment, unauthorized downloading 
of music or film, and online pornography use. In 
relation to a PDOS, 26% of respondents claimed to 
have used another student's account without 
permission at least once in the prior year. 
Additionally, 2% claimed to have done this 
misbehavior "more than a few times." (Selwyn, 
2008). Maimon and collaborators' work that 
analyzed computer-focused crimes against a large 
university computer network states that "our 
findings support the view that the routine-activities 
and lifestyle perspective could be used to explain 
cybercrime" (Maimon, 2013).  Selwyn explored the 
propensity of British university students to 
participate is "lesser" Internet-based online 
misbehavior (Selwyn, 2008). The study supports the 
notion that the propensity of such students to 
participate in unethical or illicit offline behaviors is 
exacerbated in the online arena. These two works 
from the literature support the application of Routine 
Activities Theory to the online misbehavior of 
university students.  
It follows from the application of the Routine 
Activities Theory that the nearly unlimited Internet 
access given to university students results in many 
of them engaging in questionable and possibly 
illegal behavior with respect to the use of the 
Internet. One of the activities that university students 
regularly engage in, whether in computer 
laboratories, dormitory rooms or other campus areas 
of Internet access is online gaming. It is our position 
that this opportunity, when combined with attitudes 
and behaviors developed in other activities, such as 
the participation in MMOG's, increases the 
likelihood that a student would commit a PDOS. If 
the intent of a PDOS attack is similar to cyber 
bullying, then the attitudes fostered in MMOG's 
come to light. Teng, et al. (2012) put forth that "... 
some online gamers bully other gamers either for fun 
or to satisfy their needs for dominance". Although 
online gaming and MMOG's unto themselves are 
benign upon an initial analysis and can even be used 
for educational purposes, the lack of authority 
overseeing these activities and the anonymity while 
participating online can give way to misbehaviors 
and abuses by participants. 
The participation in computer gaming, particularly 
MMOG's, can foster attitudes and behaviors that 
would predispose university students to commit 
various types of cyber-crime. Chen, et al. (2005) 
found in their analysis of online gaming crime that 
46.7% of the offenders were students and that most 
of these crimes were committed from public 
computer use areas such as Internet cafes. In fact, 
they stipulated in their work, which is now almost a 
decade old, that "such cyber-criminal activity within 
online games is increasing at an alarming rate" 
(Chen, et al., 2005). They found that the use of 
another person's online gaming account (and 
subsequent theft of their property within the game) 
without their permission was 73.7% of all computer 
gaming crime reviewed. More recent work supports 
the fact that computer gaming is now conducted by 
a majority of university students. Hainey, et al. 
(2011) surveyed 2,218 university students and found 
that 79.8% of them played some form of computer 
game on a regular basis. For males this percentage 
was even higher at 92.6%, as compared to 69.9% for 
females. This translated to an average of 7.46 hours 
per week overall with 9.02 hours for males and 4.39 
hours for females. Although the percentage playing 
online games was smaller (38% of surveyed 
students), this is still a significant portion of the 
overall student population who are familiar with the 
use of the Internet to play a game against a distant 
opponent. Even several years ago, Chen, et al. 
(2005) noted that with the growth of online gaming, 
there was a corresponding growth in gaming-related 
crimes, and particularly in MMOG games. 
It is not difficult to visualize the similarities between 
motivating factors for committing a PDOS and the 
motivation to participate in an online game. Hainey, 
et al. (2001) found that "challenge" was the most 
important reason for playing computer games among 
the students surveyed. Among online gamers, 
"competition" was the most important reason found. 
A PDOS attacker, in the context of a university 
setting, might be motivated by the challenge to lock 
another student out of his or her online services 
much the same way that computer gamer seeks the 
challenge of besting an opponent through whatever 
means is necessary. Likewise, competition in a class 
might tempt a student to lock out another student 
from student accounts in the hope that their 
academic standing and grades might be adversely 
affected. Universities that use course management 
systems with time-oriented "dropboxes" for 
assignments or online exams (as is the case with one 
of the authors) would provide opportunity for such a 
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PDOS. Tseng segmented online gamers by their 
motivations: 
a. Aggressive Gamers – those who have a high 
need for both "exploration" and 
"aggression". 
b. Social Gamers – those who have a high need 
for "exploration" and a low need for 
aggression. 
c. Inactive Gamers – those who have a low 
need for exploration and a medium need for 
aggression. 
Tseng found that aggressive gamers tended to be 
male in gender and that inactive gamers tended to be 
female in gender. Taking this information a step 
further, it is not difficult to equate an aggressive 
university-based gamer's high need for exploration 
and aggression with online misbehavior such as 
kicking or a PDOS. A single PDOS attack would be 
of limited value in terms of satisfying the needs of 
an aggressive gamer; most likely a series of such 
attacks would be undertaken. It is known that online 
gamers experience "flow" during gaming sessions. 
Flow is defined as "... the holistic experience that 
people feel when they act with total involvement" 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1997). Analogously, the 
feeling of continually "besting" a victim through a 
series of PDOS attacks might provide a similar 
motivation and loss of a sense of surroundings. 
Another potential motivating factor for a PDOS 
attack in a university environment is a form of 
revenge on a current or former boyfriend/girlfriend. 
Melander (2009) explored the harassment of 
intimate partners by university students including 
methods involving information technologies. 
"Although it may be overlooked, emotional violence 
could be as damaging online as it is in person" 
(Melander, 2009). An intimate relationship, 
especially in a university environment where 
students are in close proximity, would allow a 
current or former significant other to have gained the 
necessary knowledge of accounts and online habits 
to perform a series of PDOS attacks. 
6. LEGAL ASPECTS OF A PDOS 
It should be noted that this research was conducted 
with the assistance of a law enforcement officer who 
specializes in the investigation and prosecution of 
cyber-crime at the local, state, national and 
international levels. This law enforcement officer is 
also a college instructor of criminal justice and an 
author on cyber crime. Officer Samuel Del Rosario 
of Pennsylvania provided invaluable expert opinion 
in framing the legal nature of a PDOS and the ability 
of law enforcement to respond to concerns from a 
victim of such attacks.  
Whether it is the "online gaming mentality," the need 
for control or revenge upon another, or just the 
challenge of attempting an attack, the attacker might 
feel confident that when committing a PDOS he or 
she will suffer no legal ramifications. Selwyn (2008) 
pointed out that "... there was a strong sense among 
respondents that were was 'less chance of you being 
caught out'." This quote from a respondent in his 
research deals with what Selwyn calls the 
"diminished risk of Internet-based action" in terms 
of accountability for, and the monitoring of, student 
actions online. He goes on to point out that 
"perceptions of absolute impunity were recurrent 
throughout the data". Freestone and Mitchell (2004) 
state that "the Internet offers the 'advantages' of 
anonymity, a reduced chance of being detected 
owing to the difficulty of procuring damning 
tangible evidence, and convenience to perpetrators, 
allowing aberrant behavior to remain somewhat 
faceless". With respect to a PDOS, the fact that it is 
essentially a hybrid computer crime with a limited 
impact on an individual or small group allows it to 
"slip through the cracks" with respect to statutory 
laws. Additionally, it is very difficult to identify a 
PDOS attacker who has the requisite technical 
knowledge to ensure anonymity across several 
attacks and who plans such attacks to appear random 
in nature from a temporal point of view. A most 
worrisome aspect of a PDOS for the Information 
Security/Information Technology department of a 
university or institution of higher education is that a 
PDOS attack is easily accomplished on their 
networks and would appear to be normal Internet 
traffic. A traditional DoS attack, on the other hand, 
would be noticed immediately on a university 
network, since the traffic would cause access failures 
for the university community. On the other hand, a 
PDOS attack would be nearly impossible to 
distinguish from normal traffic patterns.  
Due to privacy rights, information about keystrokes 
and user activity on university-owned networks and 
computers cannot be made available to outside 
entities without getting approval from the judicial 
system. This means that in the absence of such an 
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allowance, an attacker committing a PDOS on a 
university computer can only be tracked internally 
and in a limited fashion. Website browser history 
and recorded network traffic are very limited in their 
ability to signal the commission of a PDOS. It would 
require more sophisticated monitoring such as a 
keystroke logger or remote desktop monitoring to 
identify a PDOS. This is due to the fact that even if 
a given computer user was tracked to a website 
where a PDOS was attempted or committed, security 
built into such websites would prevent the university 
network from seeing the actual keystrokes or seeing 
encrypted traffic that was part of a PDOS. Only with 
the use of a keystroke logger or desktop monitoring 
software could a PDOS be separated from normal 
website activity by a given user. Furthermore, 
federal regulations regarding use of the Internet and 
electronic communication are ambiguous with 
respect to whether a PDOS is an illegal activity since 
personally identifying information is not breached, 
and private data has not been accessed. One of these 
sets of regulations, the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA), deals with the illegality of 
capturing transmitted information and privacy 
(Reyes, et al., 2007). Since a PDOS is not capturing 
any information per se and private information is not 
being obtained, the researchers feel a PDOS would 
not fall under its parameters. Likewise, it would not 
fall under the Telecommunications Act or the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (Reyes, et al., 2007) 
due to the fact that "protected" computers are not 
actually being "accessed" as stated in the statute. 
And even if a PDOS attack against online banking 
was interpreted to be "accessing" a computer, the 
scope of the statue is limited to computers of 
financial institutions and the government.  
In the context of using a PDOS attack against a 
university student, many more types of online 
accounts and services used by students, beyond 
online banking, could be attacked by a PDOS 
without falling under the scope of this legislation. 
Certainly the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
could not be applied either in the case of a PDOS. 
"This legislation leaves no one legally accountable 
for cyber targeting (which includes cyber bullying, 
harassment, stalking, defamation, threats, and so 
forth)" (Shariff and Hoff, 2011). Given the difficult 
nature of identifying an attack, the limited logging 
of user activities, and the limited laws and 
regulations with respect to this activity, the authors 
believe that existing legal restrictions will not deter 
PDOS attacks. Kigerl (2012) makes the case that 
even if cybercrime laws exist within a country, their 
effects on the prevalence of cybercrime are difficult 
to predict and somewhat nebulous). In fact the 
apparent ease with which a person can commit a 
PDOS in the U.S. and most of the world, when 
combined with no effective means to legally regulate 
such actions, should allow them to continue to grow 
in popularity. Only through cyber ethics education, 
and increased awareness of such attacks by potential 
victims, will this type of cyber crime be combated. 
7. SURVEY OF STUDENTS IN FOUR 
UNIVERSITIES 
In order to help ascertain the general propensity of 
university students to commit a PDOS, we 
developed a brief anonymous survey consisting of 
four questions that was part of a larger information 
security-related paper survey given to undergraduate 
students across four universities in two countries. 
The survey was administered to provide a "proof of 
concept" that a university campus is an environment 
that would allow a PDOS to be undertaken rather 
easily both through the attitudes of students 
regarding laws protecting online account access and 
their propensity to commit an account breach. The 
survey was completely anonymous. The gender of 
each respondent was not tracked because it asked 
questions about activities that may be considered 
unethical and possibly illegal, and because the ratio 
of males to females in the class was not 1:1 (see 
below). Due to this inequality and in order to avoid 
any possible incentive for females to mask their 
answers out of fear of being identified, the question 
of gender was left out of the survey.  
The goal of the survey was to gauge student attitudes 
towards actions that may be considered part of a 
PDOS (attempt to breach an online account). The 
students fell into two main categories with respect to 
their academic pursuits and the classes utilized for 
the survey: (1) Information Sciences and 
Information Security; and (2) Business students. 
With respect to the first category, Information 
Security program students were surveyed at Dakota 
State University in South Dakota and Information 
Sciences and Technology program students were 
surveyed at Penn State University in Pennsylvania. 
Within the second category, business school 
students taking MIS courses were surveyed at the 
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New Jersey Institute of Technology in New Jersey 
and at Sakarya University in Turkey. Although 
gender was not tracked specifically in the survey, the 
class rosters revealed the approximate ratio of male 
to female for each class taking the survey. Both 
business school classes were approximately a 70/30 
percent ratio of male to female. The other two 
classes surveyed at both the South Dakota and 
Pennsylvania universities were approximately 75/25 
percent male to female. The part of the survey for 
this work consisted of four “Yes/No" questions 
related to the unauthorized use of another person's 
online account and the legality of such actions. The 
4 questions in the survey are listed below:  
1. Have you ever attempted to login into 
another person's online account (email, 
online service, ecommerce website, etc.) 
without their permission? 
2. Are you aware of any laws relating to the 
process of attempting to use another 
person's online  accounts? 
3. If no malice is intended when attempting to 
log on to another person's online accounts, 
do you think it is a useful activity for law 
enforcement to investigate and pursue 
prosecution for such activities? 
4. Have you ever suspected that someone has 
logged into your account without 
permission? 
Although none of the questions specifically mention 
a PDOS, attempting to log on to another's online 
account without their permission (known as an 
attempted account breach) is used as a surrogate 
term for a PDOS due to the fact that the term 
"PDOS" is unknown to students and a complete 
description of PDOS would not be feasible in the 
survey. Question 1 directly asks if the student being 
surveyed has attempted an online account breach. If 
someone has logged onto another's account without 
their permission, it can be said then that this person 
had the knowledge and skills to have committed a 
PDOS instead. Question 2 seeks to examine how 
aware students are of cyber security laws related to 
a breach of a person's online account. Question 3 
seeks to ascertain the attitudes of students with 
respect to being caught after committing an online 
account breach. If a student believes that an online 
account breach that is not malevolent in nature 
should not be pursued by law enforcement, then it 
can be assumed that either the student sees no wrong 
in the action or the student believes it is a futile effort 
or waste of time and resources to pursue the 
perpetrator. Question 4 looks at the potential 
vigilance of students against online account 
breaches. One would expect a student who answers 
"yes" to this question to be more vigilant and 
cautious when accessing online accounts, and to 
safeguard his or her account details and personal 
information more closely 
8. UNIVERSITY STUDENT SURVEY 
RESULTS 
We used the two-proportion test to see if respondents 
in a given university (location or group of locations) 
answer "yes" to a given question significantly more 
often than respondents from another university(s). 
The results from Question 1 of the survey (Table 1) 
show no statistically significant difference between 
the combined American student groups and the 
Turkish students group with respect to attempting to 
breach another's online accounts. This result hints at 
the pervasiveness of the act of attempting to access 
someone else's account without permission across 
countries and cultures. The results from Question 2, 
comparing the sum of the results from the American 
students with their Turkish counterparts, show a 
statistically significant difference between the two 
sets of data with American students being more 
aware of possible legal implications of using 
another's account without permission. This 
comparison is shown in Table 2 and graphically 
depicted in Figure 1. The results from this question 
hint at the greater knowledge of information security 
within the combined American group, and also a 
greater awareness of cyber-crime in general 
generated by the mass media in the U.S.  
Question 3 is related to Question 2 in that it 
ascertains student opinions on the severity of an 
online account breach. This question also showed a 
statistically significant difference between the two 
groups. Turkish students wanted law enforcement to 
investigate account breaches, even in cases where no 
malice was intended. The more conservative cultural 
aspects of Turkey could explain this difference in 
attitudes. Another potential reason could again be 
that American students are more aware of the 
pervasiveness of cyber-crime in society as shown 
constantly in the mass media and feel less threatened 
by it. The results for Question 3 are displayed in 
Table 3 and graphically in Figure 2. With respect to 
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Question 4, American students suspected 
unauthorized access of their accounts statistically 
more often than the Turkish ones. These results are 
displayed in Table 4 and graphically in Figure 3. 
Again, this could be due to the greater awareness of 
cyber-crime in the U.S. and the information security 
knowledge of the students involved in the survey.  
 
Table 1 Awareness of Laws (Hypothesis is not confirmed at Alpha = 0.05) 
Hypothesis 
U.S. 
Yes 
U.S. 
Total 
Turkey 
Yes 
Turkey 
Total 
P-Value 
U.S. students are more likely to have attempted an 
account breach than Turkish students 
31 68 8 23 0.197 
 
 
Figure 1 Question 2: Comparison between American and Turkish Students 
 
Table 2 Awareness of Laws (Hypothesis confirmed at Alpha = 0.05) 
Hypothesis 
U.S. 
Yes 
U.S. 
Total 
Turkey 
Yes 
Turkey 
Total 
P-Value 
U.S. students are more aware of laws regarding 
un-authorized use of others' online accounts than 
Turkish students 
58 93 9 22 0.033 
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Figure 2 Question 3: Comparison between American and Turkish Students 
 
Table 3 Importance of Prosecution (Hypothesis confirmed at Alpha = 0.05) 
Hypothesis 
Turkey 
Yes 
Turkey 
Total 
U.S. 
Yes 
U.S. 
Total 
P-Value 
U.S. students think investigation and prosecution 
of unauthorized logins with no malice intended is 
less useful than Turkish students 
26 30 52 90 0.002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Question 4: Comparison between American and Turkish Students 
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Table 4 Suspicion of Others Logging In (Hypothesis confirmed at Alpha = 0.05) 
Hypothesis 
U.S. 
Yes 
U.S. 
Total 
Turkey 
Yes 
Turkey 
Total 
P-Value 
U.S. students are more suspicious that others have 
logged onto their accounts without permission 
than Turkish students 
75 94 22 34 0.039 
9. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The ultimate goal of a PDOS attack is not to gain 
access to an online account; rather it is to prevent a 
legitimate online account user from having access to 
their own account. Therefore, this action would not 
violate existing federal laws such as the 
Telecommunications Act or the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse act. A PDOS attack is difficult to detect given 
that it relies on what is considered to be normal 
traffic patterns that would not be seen as out of the 
ordinary by the intrusion detection systems used by 
online service providers. A traditional DoS attack 
aims to stop services for a target device, network, or 
system and thereby affect as many people as 
possible. In contrast, a PDOS is limited in scope to a 
person or small group.  
Routine Activities Theory, when applied to cyber 
crimes such as a PDOS, suggests that university 
students need to be aware that there is a temptation 
to commit a PDOS due to the proximity of fellow 
students and their constant interface with the Internet 
and their online accounts. As put forth in Pratt, et al, 
(2010), "... parents, schools, and employers will each 
be critical to educating citizens on how to reduce 
their exposure to online risks". We recommend that 
institutions of higher learning should be providing 
students with training on how to avoid becoming a 
victim of cyber crimes, including PDOS attacks. By 
providing informal training, including 
methodologies for preventing the transfer of 
information necessary for a cyber attacks such as a 
PDOS, the risks of victimization could be reduced. 
Cesaroni, et al. (2012) described actions taken to 
prevent cyber bullying ranging from informal 
education programs to formal policy debates. We 
believe that mandatory computer-use ethics training 
for all university students would help to reduce the 
likelihood of a PDOS or other types of cyber crime 
being committed. Such training could be included in 
new student orientations, degree program ethics 
classes, and similar student learning processes. 
Routine Activities Theory would dictate that 
students should be made aware of the fact that just 
by logging onto online services on campus in the 
proximity of others, they become a potential victim 
for a PDOS attack as well as other cyber crimes. The 
first line of defense for university students is to 
prevent a common social engineering tactic known 
as "shoulder surfing". All parents teach their 
children to "look both ways" before crossing a street. 
Should not students using online services on 
university campuses be taught the same principle (to 
prevent observation of their account names and 
personal information)? This simple practice of being 
cognizant of your surroundings and whether anyone 
is watching could be incorporated into a more 
comprehensive cyber security awareness plan for 
students. 
From a technical perspective, the authors propose 
that universities ensure that user accounts are 
separate from their public personas or aliases.  
Currently, many university accounts, such as email 
addresses, give potential attackers all the 
information they need to perform a PDOS attack.  
The authors recommend that a separate user ID (or 
email) is published for external communications 
with an internal account remaining private with only 
the student and IT staff being aware of its name and 
details. This tactic would prevent the initiation of a 
PDOS attack on a student's university accounts 
without first collecting this internal account 
information. It would deter PDOS attacks in much 
the same way Network Address Translation (NAT) 
is used to shield internal IP addresses from outside 
traffic sources to deter attacks on those internal 
computers. Many active directory accounts at 
corporations already use this process for account 
names, and the authors recommend that universities 
also adopt this approach. 
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